Optimality Theory catches on in linguistics, rst in phonology, then in syntax, and recently also at the semantics / pragmatics interface. In this paper we point at some parallels between principles employed in optimality theoretic interpretation, and notions from the well-established eld of Game Theory. Optimality theoretic interpretation can be de ned as what we call an \interpretation game", and optimality itself can be viewed as a solution concept for a game. More in particular, optimality can be characterized in terms of the game-theoretical notion of a \Nash Equilibrium".
Introduction
If John says that OTS is possibly right, we can infer from this that he thinks it is not obviously, or necessarily right. What kind of inference is this? Suppose that from Possibly A we can infer semantically that it is possible that A is false. By this assumption we can easily account for the above inference, but we can no longer account for the fact that we might appropriately say OTS is possibly right, if not necessarily. The latter example makes clear that the above inference to the possibility that OTS is wrong cannot be conventionally associated with all sentences in which the sentential clause OTS is possibly right occurs. But how then should we account for the intuition that we can conclude that OTS might be wrong from what John says? Following Grice (1975) , it has become a common practice in the area of pragmatics to distinguish what is said by the speaker's use of a sentence (the semantic or truth-conditional meaning of a sentence), and what is meant by it on a particular occasion. Thus conceived, pragmatics is concerned with the study of what is meant by an utterance above its semantic, or truth-conditional, content by taking into account the issue whether the utterance is appropriate in its conversational context, i.e. with respect to the (common) beliefs and intentions of the participants of the conversation. The main motivation for this division of labour between semantics and pragmatics is to keep the semantics as simple as possible; it allows us to determine the semantic content of a sentence in a compositional way based on its syntactic structure, without making reference to the attitudes of speakers and hearers.
Following Gazdar (1979) , the following general pipe-line architecture of the semantics / pragmatics interface has emerged 1. what is said by a (declarative) sentence, its semantic content, is equated with its truth-conditions 2. truth-conditional content can be determined in a rather simple way compositionally without making reference to either what is (or could be) pragmatically implicated by what is said, or the attitudes of the participants of the conversation 3. to determine what is pragmatically implicated we can, and have to, make use of the truth-conditional content of the sentence; what is potentially implicated might be overruled, or canceled, if it con icts with what is semantically entailed, as in our above example OTS is possibly right, if not necessarily. Thus, according to Gazdar, the semantics / pragmatics interaction goes only one way; although what is pragmatically presupposed or implicated might depend on the semantic content of the sentence, semantics is autonomous from pragmatics. It seems clear to us that this strong Gazdarian picture of the interface must be wrong for the following reason: not only what is pragmatically implicated depends on the attitudes of the participants of the conversation, but this might also the case for the truth-conditions that a sentence has. Pragmatic notions like appropriateness, expectation/naturalness and relevance are both used to determine what is conversationally implicated and to determine what is asserted by a sentence. It is clear that this dependence of what is said, or asserted, on pragmatic notions undermines the goal to determine the truth-conditions of sentences in a compositional way. For an illustrative example, let us consider brie y the process of anaphora resolution for a sentence like He is tall. It is clear that this sentence is highly underspeci ed or ambiguous; in di erent contexts the pronoun might refer to di erent individuals. Its resolution implies reference to such things as focus (Sidner, 1983) , the syntactic position (subject/non-subject) of the antecedent (Grosz et al, 1995) , but also to the scenarios/prototypical situations involved (e.g. Sanford & Garrod, 1981) . Although the meaning of the sentence is highly context-dependent, the sentence has a more constant meaning too; we might say that in all contexts the pronoun refers to the most salient male individual in that context. A Gazdarian might then propose to represent this contextual information in a more or less objective way, without referring to the attitudes of the agents. What is the most salient individual in a context? For some contexts we can give rather objective criteria. For instance, it seems clear that when we utter the above sentence in the context where Bill is next to John has just been uttered, the pronoun will refer to Bill, but when the foregoing sentence would have been John is next to Bill, the pronoun would refer to John. The objective criterium in this case is that the (individual denoted by the) subject of a preceding sentence is more salient than the (individual denoted by the) object. But now consider the following discourse: Bill tickled John. He squirmed. According to the above rule the pronoun should refer to Bill. It is clear, however, that according to its most reasonable interpretation the pronoun does not refer to Bill, but to John. Why? Because we assume that it is the tickled person who has reason to squirm; the assertion that John squirmed is more in accordance with the expected scenario triggered by the previous sentence than the assertion that it is Bill who squirmed. We conclude that the speaker asserted that John squirmed, i.e., the constraint that the pronoun refers to the most salient person in its context of interpretation is overruled by the constraint that demands that what is said should be natural in its context of interpretation, i.e., in accordance with the relevant scenario. The triggered scenarios depend on world-knowledge and expectations of the participants of a conversation, which suggests that the relevant contextual parameters cannot be given without making reference to the attitudes of the speakers. But now we are running ahead of ourselves. For we might think of representing the relevant contextual parameter in the context of interpretation of the sentence in which the pronoun occurs as an`objective' salient order, when we allow with Lewis (1979) for a rule of accommodation of comparative salience. In principle this is feasible, but note that in this case it is the process of accommodation that is governed by notions like appropriateness, naturalness or relevance that cannot be described without making reference to the attitudes of agents. Notice that according to this variant the relevant contextual parameter that helps to determine what is said (its truth conditions) by an utterance, the salience ordering, crucially depends on the utterance itself; whether and how the salience order should be accommodated depends on what would have been said by this utterance according to the di erent possible salience orderings. Observe also that in this variant some constraints can be overruled by our general pragmatic notions; in this case not that a pronoun should refer to the most salient individual in its context, but rather that the salience order determined after the interpretation of the rst sentence of a discourse will function as the relevant salience order to interpret the anaphoric pronouns of the following sentence.
The above example shows that we cannot systematically determine the semantic content of a sentence in a compositional way based on its syntactic structure, without making reference to the attitudes of speakers and hearers, if we equate the semantic content of a sentence with its truth-conditions. So what should we do? Give up compositionality, or give up the assumption that what should be determined compositionally are the truth-conditions of a sentence? The former, radical, option would result almost surely in giving up the distinction between semantics and pragmatics, as has been proposed in the old days of generative semantics. According to the latter option, compositional semantics still has a role to play. However, the semantic content of a sentence is not fully determined and doesn't give rise to clearcut truthconditions, it is left underspeci ed.
We have only discussed pronouns above, but similar remarks can be, and have been, made for the interpretation of other context-dependent constructions like modals (Kratzer, 1979) , presuppositions (van der Sandt, 1992) , quanti er scope (Parikh, 1993) , tenses (Asher & Lascarides, 1994) , adjectives (Blutner, 1998) , and quanti ed constructions (Hendriks & de Hoop, to appear). For all those cases it has been proposed that what should be determined compositionally should be left rather underspeci ed, and that to determine the actual truth-conditions of a sentence we have to rely on constraints motivated by principles of rational communication as given, for instance, by Grice's maxims of conversation. This results, obviously, in a new formulation of the semantics / pragmatics interface.
Optimality Theoretic Interpretation
Recently, various phenomena on the semantics / pragmatics interface, like the ones discussed above, have been given an optimality theoretic formulation (Blutner, Hendriks and de Hoop, de Hoop and de Swart, J ager, Zeevat). In this section, and in section 4, we give a short overview of the various types of analyses that have been proposed, and illustrate these by means of a few examples.
One-Dimensional Optimality
According to the proposed application of Optimality Theoretic principles by de Hoop & de Swart (to appear) and Hendriks & de Hoop (1999) to the theory of interpretation, what compositional semantics gives us is a radically underspeci ed notion of meaning represented by a possibly in nite set of interpretations of a well-formed syntactic structure. In addition, optimality theory gives us a ranked set of constraints which allow us to select the optimal interpretation associated with a particular syntactic structure. These constraints should of course be as general as possible, and also the rankings between those constraints should, if possible, be valid for a wide range of languages, based on general principles of rational communication.
In order to illustrate how things might work out in such a theory, consider again the example which we discussed above with an anaphoric pronoun. The example is of the form aRb. He is P, where in the rst sentence a and b are both names for male individuals. Discourses of this form are potentially ambiguous, or underspeci ed, because the pronoun might refer back to either a or b. But we can say something more; on the basis of empirical data we might observe that the pronoun will typically refer back to the subject expression, i.e. a. We can state this observation explicitly in a constraint. This constraint is very particular, but we might embed this particular constraint within a more general one, if we make use of the notion of comparative salience. In whatever way we do this, the important point is that the relevant constraint should not be too hard; in some circumstances it might be overruled. In the above discussed discourse Bill tickled John. He squirmed, for instance, it doesn't seem natural to state that Bill squirmed after the rst sentence. Because it seems reasonable, with an eye upon the communicative aims, to assume that the constraint on naturalness is more important than the constraint on salience, the constraint that in our case demands that the pronoun should refer to the subject expression of the previous sentence becomes overruled. Thus, although pronouns are meant to refer back to subject expressions of previous sentences, this will only result in an optimal interpretation in case the stronger constraint of naturalness is also met.
Another example, discussed in Hendriks and de Hoop, is the following: (1) Often when I talk to a doctor i , the doctor fi;jg disagrees with him fi;jg . In the interpretation of this example two constraints are at work: Atlas & Levinson (1981) and Horn (1984) , who seek to reduce the maxims of quantity, relation and manner to the following two principles; the Q-principle, (implementing Grice's rst maxim of quantity), which advises the speaker to say as much as he can to ful ll his communicative goals, and the I-principle (called R-principle by Horn (1984) , and implementing the rest of the Gricean maxims except for quality), which advises the speaker to say no more than he must to ful ll his communicative goals. By means of the I-principle we can explain, for instance, why in many contexts we can use (short, and thus e cient) pronouns to refer to individuals, instead of long eternal de nite descriptions, and it can also help to explain why in many cases the conjunctive connective and gives rise to a temporal, or even causal, interpretation. The Q-principle is responsible for the so-called scalar implicatures, and makes essential reference to alternative expressions the speaker could have used.
Although both principles have the e ect that the hearers can conclude more from the utterance than what is explicitly said by it, the strenghthenings due to the I and Q principles typically go in opposite directions. As a result, the two principles sometimes advise the speaker to do opposite things, and thus we would expect that the hearers sometimes don't know what to make of the utterance. For instance if you say John was able to solve the problem, I can conclude by means of the I-principle that John actually solved the problem, while the Q-principle gives rise to the opposite conclusion that John actually did not solve the problem. (For otherwise you should have said he did so.) Horn (1984) , following Zipf (1949) , gives an interesting motivation for why the I-and Q-principles seem to give rise to opposite conclusions. He argues that the principles can be seen as representations of rational goals of competing forces to minimize their e orts: The I-principle represents the speaker's goal to minimize the e ort to communicate as much as possible, while the Q-principle can be seen to represent the hearer's goal to minimize his e ort to understand. 2 Looking at both principles from a minimization point of view has the e ect that the I-principle and the Q-principle should be seen from two 2. Notice the resemblance with Sperber & Wilson's (1986) Relevance Theory, according to which meaning { optimal relevance { can be thought of as a balance between the two competing forces of maximization of contextual e ect and minimizing of processing e ort.
di erent perspectives: the I-principle from the speaker's perspective, and the Q-principle from the hearer's perspective. Interestingly, the principles can be viewed, equivalently it seems, from a maximization point of view when we switch roles. That is, an I-maxim requiring a cooperative speaker to say no more than needed, will make a rational hearer to get as much as possible out of which the speaker says, that is, in such a cooperative setting, the I-principle relates to a hearer's goal to maximize the relevance, or informativity, of a given utterance. Conversely, the Q-principle, advices the speaker to maximize his contribution to the goal of being as informative as he can. (As it indeed was upon Grice's formulation.) The two points of view thus collaborate to achieve two mutually dependent goals of the interlocutors: to maximize the cooperative and mutual goal of informativity, and to minimize individual e orts.
Two-Dimensional Optimality Theoretic Interpretation
Blutner (1998, 1999) has recently given the I-and Q-principle a slightly different formulation such that the Gricean maxims can be seen as being part of a two-dimensional optimality theoretic framework of disambiguation. The I-principle is formulated much like it was above from a maximization point of view, and helps to select the most coherent, or relevant, interpretation. This principle corresponds to the one-direction view on optimality theoretic interpretation as proposed by Hendriks & de Hoop (to appear) and De Hoop & De Swart (to appear), which, exclusively, adopt the hearer's perspective on disambiguation. What is interesting is that Blutner also implements the Q-principle within an Optimality Theoretical framework, thereby also taking the speaker's perspective into account. Where the I-principle compares di erent possible interpretations for the same syntactic expression, the Qprinciple compares di erent possible syntactic expressions that the speaker could have used to communicate the same meaning. The interesting feature of Blutner's formulation of the Q-principle within two-dimensional OT is that although it compares alternative syntactic inputs to one another, it still helps to select the optimal meaning among the various possible outputs of the single actual syntactic input given, by acting as a blocking mechanism. 3 The strong version of Blutner's two-dimensional OT can be formulated as follows (we here relate pairs (r; m) of possible representations (r) and meanings (m), by means of an ordering relation`>',`being more e cient'): (2) Two-dimensional OT (Strong Version) a representation-meaning pair (r; m) is optimal i it satis es both the Q-and the I-principle, where: (Q) (r; m) satis es the Q-principle i there is no other pair (r 0 ; m) such that (r 0 ; m) > (r; m) (I) (r; m) satis es the I-principle i there is no other pair (r; m 0 ) such that (r; m 0 ) > (r; m) How does this blocking due to the Q-principle work? Consider the scalar implicature again from Possibly A to Not necessarily A. Let us suppose that the speaker knows all about the possibility of A, and that he has the opportunity to say Possibly A (3p), Necessarily A (2p) and the negation of these modal possibilities (:3p 2:p and :2p 3:p, respectively). Let us also assume, as seems quite natural, that 2p j = 3p. Given these assumptions, the speaker knows that only one of three logical possibilities obtains:
(i) that 2p (and, hence, 3p), (ii) that 3p^3:p (so :2:p^:2p), or (iii) that 2:p (i.e., :3p and 3:p).
Furthermore, there is a common preference to communicate as much as possible, that is, a preference for (i) and (iii) over (ii). In this situation, saying Possibly A (3p) implicates 3:p. For if the speaker had information to the e ect that :3:p 2p, he would have said Necessarily A, which is more informative. As he has not done so, and as long as there is no reason to suppose otherwise, the hearer is entitled to infer 3:p. So, although the sentence Possibly A is logically consistent with both Necessarily A and Possibly not A, the rst is blocked (by the Q-principle), because of the existence of an alternative syntactic form that would express that meaning in a more e cient way.
Game Theory and Strong Optimality
The ranking and judging of representations and meanings in optimality theoretic interpretation has a structure which resembles principles developed in the well-investigated eld of Game Theory. In this section we present a game-theoretical formulation of Blutner's notion of optimality. (For an indepth introduction to game theory, cf., e.g., Osborne and Rubinstein 1994). The rst section presents an introduction to some of the basics of Game Theory, in particular to that of a strategic game. In the next subsection we present the notion of a`Nash Equilibrium', a renown solution concept in Game Theory. In the third subsection we then show how optimality theoretic interpretation can be given a formulation in terms of an interpretation game, and that Blutner's concept of optimality corresponds to precisely this concept of a Nash Equilibrium.
A Formal De nition of Games
In Game Theory, a`strategic game' is the formal rendering of a game which can be played with a speci c number of players, who can play various roles in the game. In strategic games it is assumed that the players all make one choice at the beginning of the game. The players (simultaneously) choose a strategy, and then they play the game, each according to the strategy chosen. It is assumed that the players know what options are available to them and to the other players, and what are the outcomes of the game if they know the actions chosen. If all the players have made their choice, we get what is called an`action pro le'. Intuitively, such a pro le is one of the possible courses which a game may take. If our players are 1; : : : ; n and if they choose actions a 1 ; : : : ; a n 2 j2N A j then that's one possible`run' of the game.
Players are assumed to choose an action which has a preferred result. Preferences over results are given by the preference relations ( i ) which are taken to depend wholly and only on the particular actions which the players may choose. Thus, if the players 1; : : : ; n choose actions a = a 1 ; : : : ; a n , respectively, then the result may be better for one player i than when they choose b = b 1 ; : : : ; b n . In that case, we nd that a > i b , that is, a i b and not b i a Obviously, it may be the case that a > i b and a > j b for two pro les a and b and players i and j. (This is the case, typically, when two players have competing or con icting interests.) In general it is assumed that preference relations are re exive, transitive and complete.
It may be clear, even from these introductory comments, that the consequences of a particular choice of player i for action a i generally depend, not only on this particular choice, but also on the choices which the other players make. Thus, if the players 1; : : : ; n choose the action pro le a = a 1 ; : : : ; a n , respectively, then player a i may be happy about the result, but if player i sticks to his choice a i , while the others In order to clarify these notions a bit more, consider the following somewhat stylized example. A famous two player game is a`coordination game' called`Bach or Strawinsky'. 4 In this game two persons want to go out. They can choose between the performance of a concert of Bach and the performance of a concert of Strawinsky. One player (Bonnie) prefers to go to Bach, the other (Clyde) prefers Strawinsky, but the main concern of both players is to go out together. 
B S B (3; 2) (1; 1) S (0; 0) (2; 3)
In this matrix, we have lled in payo pairs (n; m) which indicate the relative payo of a speci c action pro le (x; y) for Bonnie and Clyde, respectively.
Thus, the pair (3; 2) indicates the relative payo of Bonnie (3) 
Nash Equilibria as Solutions
One of the central notions in game theory is that of a solution concept. In general, solution concepts are abstract and formal speci cations of certain optimality recipes. They relate to the reasonable choices which players may make, given some notion of rationality and common knowledge. A very well known solution concept is that of a`Nash Equilibrium'. A Nash Equilibrium of a strategic game hN; (A i ); ( i )i is an action pro le a 2 j2N A j such that: (8) Intuitively, this says the following. A Nash Equilibrium is a pro le in which each player's action is a best response to the choices of the other players in that pro le. For no player i is there any alternative a i for the action a i which he chooses in a , by means of which she can get a better payo , given that all the other players choose as they choose in a . A Nash Equilibrium clearly need not give the best possible result which one player might prefer. A player gets the best payo relative to the choices of the other players in the pro le, and this really is an equilibrium because this holds for all players.
If we now return to the example which we discussed above we can see that it has two Nash Equilibria, the ones in which both Bonnie and Clyde choose Bach, and the one in which both choose Strawinsky. It is expedient to see why these pro les qualify as equilibria. The pro le (B; B) is a Nash Equilibrium because, given that Bonnie chooses Bach, the best possible outcome for Clyde obtains when he chooses Bach as well (since (B; B) > c (B; S)), while given that Clyde chooses Bach, Bach is also the very best choice for Bonnie (since (B; B) > b (S; B)). Something analogous holds of the (S; S) equilibrium. In both pro les, none of the two players has reason to deviate from the choice he actually makes. Surely, when Bonnie considers the Nash Equilibrium (S; S) she might reason as follows: \well, I better choose Bach than Strawinsky, because given that choice, it is better for Clyde to choose Bach as well, and I like (B; B) better than (S; S)" and therefore choose Bach after all. However, this type of reasoning does not by itself constitute a sound solution concept, because if Clyde also reasons this way, he will choose Strawinsky, and the outcome is (B; S), a pro le which is worse, for both Bonnie and Clyde, than the outcome of each of the two mentioned equilibria. The nice point about the two Nash Equilibria in the Bach or Strawinsky game is that the two equilibria are not absolutely optimal pro les for both players, but optimal pro les relative to the other's choices. Both equilibria are satisfying for both players in this sense, or`stable'.
In the de nition of a Nash equilibrium, the only preferences that really 
Interpretation Games
From these introductory remarks the reader may already feel some connection between the notion of a solution concept and that of optimality. Both rely on a notion of`better then' and both acknowledge a form of non-perfect optimality. Actually, we can formulate the optimality theoretic interpretation as an interpretation game.
An interpretation game is played between two players, an (abstract) speaker (S) and an (abstract) hearer (H). On the one hand, the speaker wants to communicate a certain meaning and she has to choose a suitable formulation for it; on the other, the hearer gets confronted with a certain formulation, and he has to assign it a suitable interpretation. Thus, the speaker's possible actions are given by the set of possible representations, the hearer's actions are given by the set of possible meanings, and the proles are pairs of representations and possible meanings. Optimality theoretic preferences < next can be used to de ne preference relations > S and > H over these pairs, and given these preference relations, some pairs of representation and meaning come out as optimal. Finally, when we evaluate for optimality, we always look along one dimension at a time. An optimal pro le is one for which no player has a strictly better alternative, given that the other dimension remains xed. By way of illustration, consider a very simple and stylized example. Suppose that we have two names,`Bach' and`Strawinsky', or`b' and`s', for short, and two possible referents, Bach (B) and Strawinsky (S). Suppose that we also have two semantic constraints, according to which`b' preferably refers to B, and`s' to S. This game can be displayed as follows:
Trivially, this interpretation game of the Bach or Strawinsky variety has two Nash Equilibria, which also constitute two optimal interpretations (`b',B) and (`s',S). For given that S wants to refer to B, he'd better use`b' and given that H hears`b', the interpretation better be B. Similarly, for the pro le or interpretation (`s',S). As trivial as the example may be, it certainly shows the parallel in the type of reasoning involved in the determination of optimality as an equilibrium.
Let us now turn to two more interesting examples reminiscent of one we discussed above, viz., (1): (11) Bill loves himself. (12) Bill loves him. In a matrix, the interpretation of the two sentences can be rendered as follows: (13) Lbb Lbx self' " him'
!
There are two possible representations,`self', which is short for (11) and him', short for (12) . Assuming that these are evaluated in a context where Bill is salient already, there are two possible interpretations: that Bill loves himself (Lbb) and that Bill loves someone else (Lbx), a person which presumably is to be found in the context. The arrows indicate the preferences resulting from principle (B) and (DOAP): 5 (B) If two arguments of the same semantic relation are not marked as being identical, interpret them as being distinct (DOAP) Don't Overlook Anaphoric Possibilities Like we said, it is assumed that (B) is stronger than (DOAP). Given this, the pro le (`him',Lbb) is ruled out by (`self',Lbb) because it violates (B) and there is a better alternative, and this is indicated by ". Similarly, and as indicates, (`self',Lbx) is ruled out by (`self',Lbb), because it violates (DOAP). Finally, although, (`him',Lbx) violates DOAP, it is better than (`him',Lbb), since the latter violates (B), which is judged a stronger constraint. As the pictures shows, the matrix has two Nash Equilibria, (`self',Lbb) and (`him',Lbx), precisely the two representation meaning pairs argued for. 6 Before we carry on, it is expedient to inspect some general properties of interpretation games. It is easily seen that the following holds:
Observation 1 (Optimality Subsumes Nash) a pro le is strongly optimal if and only if it is a Nash Equilibrium
The next observation relies on the assumption that the ordering relation > 5. The arrows in these matrices thus do not show the rankings of the constraints themselves, but the e ects of their rankings on the preferences of the speaker and the hearer, respectively. As will be shown in more detail below, di erent constraints and di erent rankings may eventually yield the same preferences for speaker and hearer. 6. We thank Reinhart Blutner for pointing out a aw in an earlier presentation we gave of de Hoop's analysis. 
End of Proof.
The last observation is of interest from a linguistic perspective. In Game Theory, the absence of Nash Equilibria is not at all unusual, for instance in the case of zero-sum games like`Heads or Tails', which can be displayed as follows: (14) H T H (0; 1) (1; 0) T (1; 0) (0; 1) or
Well-foundedness of > means that we are dealing with a particular type of game, in which solutions are guaranteed to exist. It is easily acknowledged that this makes sense: if an interpretation game were to have no solutions, then communication would be quite a void enterprise indeed.
A couple of other more general observations can be made at this point. Of course, an interpretation game would also be void if all pro les were Nash Equilibria. In that case any representation could be associated with any interpretation. With an eye on the use of language in communication, the ideal situation would obtain if the set of solutions is a one-to-one relation between the set of possible representations and the set of possible meanings. Interesting mixed cases can be characterized as well. Ambiguity obtains in situations in which the set of solutions is one-to-many; when the solutions are many-to-one we have synonymy; and when certain possible meanings do not occur in solutions we have expressive incompleteness.
Games and Weak Optimality
We have seen above that Blutner's strong version of two-dimensional OT can be neatly formulated using the game-theoretical concept of a Nash Equilibrium. However, Blutner (1998) , and subsequently J ager (1999) and Zeevat (1999), have employed a`weak' notion of optimality which is more subtle than the one we discussed in section 2. In this section we discuss this re nement, and show that it also can be given a very intuitive Game Theoretical formulation.
Blutner / J ager Optimality
In his (1998) paper, Blutner argues that the strong notion of optimality presented in section 2 is not entirely satisfactory. This notion does not enable us to account for Horn's (1984) division of pragmatic labour, the intuition that unmarked forms tend to be used for unmarked situations and marked forms for marked situations.
To account for cases where Horn's division of pragmatic labour is relevant, Blutner (1998) if it is super-optimal in the Blutner sense J ager's assumptions about > can be argued to be pretty harmless. Transitivity, of course, is a very natural property of the`better than' relation > and well-foundedness is natural, too. The important di erence between the weak and strong notions of optimality is that the weak one accepts (super)-optimal representation-meanings pairs that would not be optimal according to the strong version. It typically allows marked expressions to have an optimal interpretation, although both the expression and the cases they describe have a more e cient, or more typical, counterpart. Consider, for instance, the following minimal pair discussed by Horn (1984) : (18 (18) has intuitively the result that the sentence will be about an event where the car stopped in the stereotypical way, i.e. where the driver of the car stepped on the brake pedal. This by itself can be explained by means of the strong version of two-dimensional OT, and corresponds to a Nash-Equilibrium; unmarked is preferred to marked, and stereotypical ways of stopping cars are easier to understand than alternative unusual methods. But the strong version cannot explain why also the marked form, (19) , has an interpretation; the interpretation where the car was stopped in an unusual way (pulling the emergency brake, telekinesis, etc.). It is easy to see, however, that the weak version of two-dimensional OT can explain why (19) gets this interpretation. The marked form gets the atypical interpretation, because this form-meaning pair is optimal: (i) the alternative sentence (18) doesn't get this atypical interpretation, and (ii) we prefer to refer to the typical situation by using (18) instead of (19) . For another example where, because of the division of pragmatic labour, the more specialized, or more complex, form of two in principle co-extensive expressions will be associated with the less preferred reading, look at the two following sentences discussed by Levinson (1987) : (20) He i wants PRO i;j to win. (21) He i wants him i;j to win. Although a full pronoun like \him" could in principle refer to the same object as the null PRO, the selection of the full pronoun over its empty counterpart in fact signals the absence of the coreferential reading. On the assumption that coreferentiallity is the preferred, or typical, option, strong optimality can explain why (20) gets the coreferential reading. But we need weak optimality to explain why also (21) gets a reading, namely the less preferred non-coreferential one. The reason is, again, that the preferred coreferential reading is blocked due to the existence of the less lexicalized expression (20) that could have been used. Before we turn to the game-theoretical formulation of the Blutner / J ager notion of (weak) optimality, it is expedient to present J ager's algorithm for computing optimal representation-meaning pairs. The algorithm computes which pairs are optimal and which are blocked, in a recursive manner. It starts o with empty sets opt and blo of optimal and blocked pairs and terminates when all pairs are either optimal or blocked. It is convenient to indicate the pairs which have not yet been classi ed as pairs which are still in the game: gam = opt blo. (Thus, at the start of the algorithm, all pairs are in the game; in the end gam is empty.) The algorithm is de ned as follows: (22) return opt; By means of this procedure, rst all the strongly optimal representationmeaning pairs are selected as opt; then those pairs are selected as blocked for which there is an optimal alternative along the Q-or I-dimension; then those for which there is no better alternative in the game are selected as opt, etc. When all pairs are, thus, categorized, the algorithm returns the set of J ager optimal (i.e., Blutner super-optimal) pairs as output. In what follows, these are called BJ-optimal.
A Game-Theoretical De nition of BJ-Optimality
We have seen that the notion of strong optimality corresponds to that of a Nash Equilibrium. Now, although weak or BJ-optimality and Nash are also closely related, they are not the same, of course. BJ-optimality is a weaker (or softer) notion so that the set of Nash Equilibria of an interpretation game is or can be a proper subset of the optimal solutions. For instance, for some representation meaning pairs (r; m) there may be`better' alternatives (r 0 ; m) or (r; m 0 ), which however do not qualify as optimal, if there are yet other alternatives (r 0 ; m 0 ) which are.
A nice illustration can be given by means of a reanalysis of de Hoop's case of`self' versus`him', which is suggested to us by Reinhard Blutner. According to this analysis, there are two constraints at work, an expressive constraint`referential economy' (RE) and an interpretive constraint`local antecedent': (RE) a re exive element is preferable to a pronoun (LA) a syntactic domain must contain a pronoun's antecedent The e ect of these constraints can be modeled by means of the following matrix for the corresponding interpretation game: (23) Lbb Lbx self'
" " him' where`self' is again short for the sentence`Bill loves himself' and`him' for Bill loves him'. In this case there is a clear preference for using sentence`self' (the two "'s), and a preference for interpreting`self' and`him' as Bill (the two 's). As can be seen from the diagram, this game has only one Nash Equilibrium: (`self',Lbb), the only pro le from which no arrow leaves. However, there is also a BJ-optimal pro le (`him',Lbx) which is not a Nash Equilibrium. For, although there are better alternatives (`him',Lbb), and (`self',Lbx), these are themselves both overruled by the alternative (`self',Lbb). In other words, although, (`him',Lbb) > H (`him',Lbx), and (`self',Lbx) > S (`him',Lbx), these preference do not count because the preferred alternatives are each blocked by the Nash / optimal (`self',Lbb), since (`self',Lbb) > S (`him',Lbb) and (`self',Lbb) > H (`self',Lbx).
In the representation of an interpretation game we can visualize this kind of blocking by removing arrows. That is, if a pro le points to a Nash Equilibrium, then all pointers to that pro le can be removed. If we, thus, remove the arrows pointing to pro les which point to the equilibrium in the example above, then we get the following, derived game: (24) Lbb Lbx self' " him' In the resulting interpretation game we nd two Nash Equilibria, corresponding to the two BJ-optimal solutions in the original game. This result can be generalized for more involved games with more than two representations and meanings. In such more involved games, the removal of preferences may yield games with new equilibria, and these in their turn may block yet other alternatives. Thus, if we successively keep on removing preferences for blocked pro les, then we collect more and more possible solutions, and if this process reaches a xed point, then all the resulting Nash Equilibria of the xed point correspond to the BJ-optimal pairs in the original game. As a matter of fact, such a procedure is the Interpretation Game Theoretical counterpart of J ager's algorithm.
Formally, this procedure can be speci ed as follows. Let I 0 be an interpretation game hN; (A S ; A H ); (> S;0 ; > H;0 )i, with > i a strict preference relation. Then we de ne the game I n+1 |which is the game I n with updated preferences|as follows: (25) I n+1 = hN; (A S ; A H ); (> S;n+1 ; > H;n+1 )i with 1. > S;n+1 = > S;n n f(y; z) j 9x 2 NE In : x > H;n yg and 2. > H;n+1 = > H;n n f(y; z) j 9x 2 NE In : x > S;n yg (In this de nition NE In indicates the set of Nash Equilibria of game I n .) If we now construct a sequence of interpretation games I 0 ; : : : ; I n ; : : : and if we nd that I n+1 = I n , then: Observation 3 (BJ-Solutions are Nash in Updated Games) the BJ-optimal solutions of I 0 are the Nash Equilibria of I n This fact can be proved by comparing the update of preferences with J ager's algorithm for computing optimal solutions. J ager's procedure involves the iterated generation of optimal and blocked pro les. In the rst run of this procedure pro les are accepted as optimal which are Nash Equilibria in I 0 7
and next those are blocked which have an optimal alternative. It is relatively easily seen that: 1. updates of preferences preserve Nash Equilibria 2. if an update produces a new Nash Equilibrium, then the same pro le was BJ-optimal at earlier stages 3. if we reach a xed point I n , then all pro les either are a Nash Equilibrium (have no arrow leaving that pro le), or are blocked (point at a Nash Equilibrium) Here we witness one merit of viewing optimality theoretic interpretation in terms of (interpretation) games: BJ-optimal solutions can be characterized by means of the independently motivated and well-studied notion of a Nash Equilibrium. 8 7. Since the procedure starts with empty sets of blocked and optimal pro les, the selected optimals (r; m) are those for which there is no preferred alternative (r 0 ; m 0 ); of course it may be that there is such an alternative for a Nash Equilibrium, in case r Thus, in I 2 , pro le (r 2 ; m 2 ) comes out as Nash Equilibrium as well. In short, we will nd that in game I n we have Nash Equilibria (r i ; m i ) for all i n, so that we construct the diagonal as the solution of I 0 .
The last example also constitutes inspiration for the following proposition:
Observation 4 (Linearizing Unambiguous Interpretation Games) if the set of solutions of an interpretation game is a one-to-one relation between representations and meanings, then the preferences in the game can be equivalently stated by means of a linear order of representations and meanings Proof. If the solutions constitute such a one-to-one relation, and if we order the solutions, then we can identify the i-st representation r i with the representation in the i-st solution, and the i-st meaning with the meaning in the i-st solution; then we can take H's preferences to be de ned by precedence in the sequence of meanings, and S's preferences by precedence in the sequence of representations, and the resulting set of solutions is the diagonal, the set of solutions we started out with. End of Proof.
On Two Two Interpretation Games
In this section we give a systematic study of two two interpretation games, that is games with four pro les. If we, thus, restrict our attention, we can in principle distinguish seven possible types: one in which there is no solution, one in which there is one solution, one in which there are four, one in which there are three, and three in which there are two: (26) (All other types are logical permutations of these types of games.) As we already observed above the rst case is excluded by J ager's well-foundedness of > and the second two are void. A three-solutions game is in a sense a combination of the rst two two-solutions games. The rst two-solutions game models ambiguity, the second synonymy and (expressive) incompleteness, and the last is the (ideal) diagonal type.
It is interesting to note that the last type of interpretation can again be obtained in a variety of ways. All of the following matrices have the diagonal as a solution: (27) 
(Besides, any matrices which is a mirror of these matrices along one of the two diagonals, yields the same result as well.) In all matrices (and their mirror-images) except (the mirror-images of the) rst one, one solution is not Nash, that is, in these cases the BJ-optimality of that pro le is obtained by blocked preferences. This is interesting, because it shows that one and the same result can be obtained by a variety of preferences. However, this does not mean that any statement of preferences, which gives the right results, is equally good. In order to appreciate this point, consider the pair of examples discussed in Hendriks and de Hoop (to appear), under the analysis suggested by Blutner:
(1) Often when I talk to a doctor i , the doctor fi;jg disagrees with him fi;jg . (28) Often when I talk to a doctor i , the doctor fi;jg disagrees with himself fi;jg . A BJ-optimal interpretation of example (1) is one in which the indices on the noun phrases \the doctor" and \him" are di erent, so that either \the doctor" or \him" is interpreted as anaphoric upon \a doctor", not both. An optimal interpretation of example (28) is one in which both \the doctor" and \himself" are interpreted as anaphoric upon \a doctor". These results can be obtained by the joint e ect of the two constraints (RE) and (LA) which we repeat here for convenience: (RE) a re exive element is preferable to a pronoun (LA) a syntactic domain must contain a pronoun's antecedent The relevant preferences are displayed in the following diagram: This is a diagram of the third diagonal type, in which (`the doctor{him',fi; jg) is a BJ-optimal solution because the (LA)-preference for (`the doctor{him',(i; i)) is blocked by the (RE)-preference of (`the doctor{self',(i; i)) over this alternative, and because the (RE)-preference for (`the doctor{self',fi; jg) is blocked by the (LA)-preference of (`the doctor{self',(i; i)) over this alternative. However, as we argued, we could have obtained the very same result if the preferences were spelled out, alternatively, as indicated by the following diagram: 
!
In this diagram, we have encoded the e ect of the converse of the principles (RE) and (LA), and we have obtained a mirror image of the original matrix. This time the solution (`the doctor{him',fi; jg) is optimal (Nash), and the interpretation of (`the doctor{self',(i; i)) turns out BJ-optimal, but the resulting BJ-optimal pairs are the same. Does this mean that we can get away with using the converses of any two or more principles? Certainly not. This can be appreciated when we look at a more general case, where we take more possibilities ((j; j), and fj; kg) into account: " " "
the doctor{him' With the principles (RE) and (LA) we get the right solutions (`the doctor{ self',(i; i)) and (`the doctor{him',fi; jg). If, instead, we had adopted their counterintuitive converses, the solutions would have been, incorrectly, (`the doctor{self',(j; j)) and (`the doctor{him',fj; kg). This exercise thus shows that not any way of getting certain interpretation results is ne. It also shows that one should be careful with the notion of (BJ-)optimality, or that of a solution in interpretation games. Optimal pro les can get blocked if more options get considered (and if more constraints are involved).
Prospects and Conclusions
In this paper we have pointed out some parallelisms between some notions studied in Optimality Theory and in Game Theory. Optimality theoretic interpretation can be modeled in terms of an interpretation game, and both Blutner's notion of (strong) optimality, as well as the Blutner / J ager notion of (weak) optimality, can be de ned as a Nash Equilibrium of the interpretation game, or of an update of it.
We have restricted ourselves, here, in two respects. Of the various types of games studied in Game Theory we have studied only one, and we have concentrated upon only one type of solution concept. The natural question that arises is if optimality theoretic interpretation would not gain if we employed other kinds of games (extensive, in stead of strategic, games; games with imperfect, rather than complete, information) and other solution concepts. In this respect we must mention Parikh (1991) , who applies Game Theory to an analysis of the process of disambiguation, and who employs extensive cooperative game with partial information. It remains an open question how Parikh's approach relates to the one discussed in this paper.
Another restriction is that we have concentrated mainly on the formal parallelism between optimality games. However, the parallel with the work of Parikh, and the intuitions behind the Q-and I-principles, suggest that the parallelism goes deeper. Optimality crucially involves both the speaker and the hearer, conceived of as rational agents with possibly opposing preferences. An optimal interpretation of a sentence can thus be seen as the result of (hypothetical) negotiation between two players who, with their particular beliefs and desires, engage in a communication game. Here lies an interesting parallel with the approach advocated in Merin (1997) . Merin construes verbal interaction as a game in which speaker and hearer have strictly opposing preferences. It would be interesting to see if this can be given an optimality style formulation. After all, also in strictly competitive games, the players' strategies are guided by the intended optimization of the results. 
